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Abstract
In this work, we consider the problem of secure multi-party computation (MPC), consisting of Γ
sources, each has access to a large private matrix, N processing nodes or workers, and one data collector
or master. The master is interested in the result of a polynomial function of the input matrices. Each
source sends a randomized functions of its matrix, called as its share, to each worker. The workers
process their shares in interaction with each other, and send some results to the master such that it can
derive the final result. There are several constraints: (1) each worker can store a function of each input
matrix, with the size of 1m fraction of that input matrix, (2) up to t of the workers, for some integer t, are
adversary and may collude to gain information about the private inputs or can do malicious actions to
make the final result incorrect. The objective is to design an MPC scheme with the minimum number the
workers, called the recovery threshold, such that the final result is correct, workers learn no information
about the input matrices, and the master learns nothing beyond the final result. In this paper, we propose
an MPC scheme that achieves the recovery threshold of 3t+ 2m− 1 workers, which is order-wise less
than the recovery threshold of the conventional methods. The challenge in dealing with this set up is that
when nodes interact with each other, the malicious messages that adversarial nodes generate propagate
through the system, and can mislead the honest nodes. To deal with this challenge, we design some
subroutines that can detect erroneous messages, and correct or drop them.
Index Terms
multi-party computation, polynomial codes, secure computation, massive matrix computation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In many applications, preserving privacy of data is one of the major concerns, when the computation
is outsources to some external nodes.
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2Secure bidding and auction [1], secure E-voting [2], preserving privacy data mining [3], sharing
of signature [4], and private information retrieval [5] are some applications that preserving privacy
of data is indeed the main concern. Processing private inputs on several nodes where some of them
are untrusted is studied in the context of secure multi-party computation. Multi-party computation is
introduced to be able to distribute processing among some nodes, without leaking any information, even
though some of them may collude or behave adversarial [6]–[17]. Security of a multi-party computation
systems can be guaranteed cryptographically [6]–[8], [10], or information theoretically [9], [11]–[16].
In a cryptographically secure systems, breaking the encryption system requires infeasible computation
power, and is not practically possible. In an information theoretically secure system, adversarial nodes
can not gain any information about the secret, even if they have unlimited computing power. In this
paper, the objective is to design an information-theoretically secure MPC scheme, for the cases where
the size of the input data is massive, and thus the computation has to be distributed among some nodes,
where some of them are curious about the input, or adversary seeking to make the final result incorrect.
Recently, coding techniques has been developed to deal with another important challenge in dis-
tributing massive computing to external nodes, which is latency of the system due stragglers [18]–[24].
In distributed systems, to have the final result of computation, we need to wait for slowest nodes, or
stragglers [18].
To solve this problem, in [19] and [20], it is proposed to use Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) codes
to inject coded redundancy in computing, and thus avoid waiting for the slowest nodes. In [21], polynomial
codes is developed for distributed massive matrix multiplications, where the results of computations at
the processing nodes form an optimum code, minimizing the number of workers that we need to wait
for, known as the recovery threshold. Polynomial codes are extended to entangled polynomial codes and
Matdot code in [12], [23] to admit more flexible partitioning of each input matrix.
In [24], CodedSketch is proposed which also enables us to compute an approximation of the multiplica-
tion of two massive matrices, and reduces the recovery threshold depending on the required accuracy. In
addition, in [25], Lagrange codes are proposed, using a different approach, to embed coded redundancy
in computing parallel computations of one arbitrary polynomial function for different inputs, where
computation of the the function for one input is within computation and storage capacity of one worker.
Ideas from coded computing have been used to develop MPC for massive data [12]–[14], [25]–[35]. In
[12]–[14], a scheme for MPC is proposed to compute arbitrary polynomial functions of massive matrices.
The scheme of [12]–[14] is based a new sharing scheme, called polynomial sharing, which is inspired
by polynomial coding [21]. The number of workers needed for this computation is order-wise less than
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3conventional approaches which are based on job-splitting. The scheme of [12]–[14] is developed for the
cases, where some of the nodes are semi-honest, meaning that they follow the protocol, but may collude
to gain information about the inputs. Another closely related, and parallel, line of work is known as
secure matrix multiplication [26]–[34], where the focus is to compute the result of matrix multiplication
without leaking any information to the workers. In addition, Lagrange codes [25] can handle private
computation of many parallel computation of the same function for different inputs, for the cases where
some workers are colluding or adversarial. Unlike [12]–[14], in both secure matrix multiplication [26]–
[34] and Lagrange codes [25], there is no interaction among the workers. The advantage is that the data
collector can deal with adversarial nodes, at the decoding level, at the cost of increasing the recovery
threshold. The disadvantage is that for secure matrix multiplication, the scheme is limited to pairwise
matrix multiplication, and for Lagrange codes [25], the recovery threshold grows linearly with the degree
of the polynomial. The main objective of this paper is to develop an MPC for an arbitrary polynomial
function, for the cases where some of the workers are adversarial. In this formulation, like [12]–[14], the
workers interact with each other, which makes managing adversarial nodes challenging. Later, in Section
II, we will explain the basic differences of this work with secure matrix multiplication and Lagrange
codes.
In this paper, we consider an MPC system, including some sources, where each of them has access to
a large and private matrix. There is a data collector that is interested in an arbitrary polynomial function
of the input matrices. For computing resources, there are some workers that can interact with each other.
Each worker can take a function of each input, with the size of 1m fraction of each input matrix. All
workers are honest, except up to t of them, for some integer t, who are malicious. This means that they
can collude to gain information about the input and/or do whatever they can to make the final result
incorrect. This includes sending misleading information to other workers. The objective is to design an
MPC scheme, such that the data collector can recover the function correctly, in presence of adversarial
behavior of the malicious nodes. In addition, the workers gain no information about the input data.
Moreover the data collector gain no information about the input matrices, beyond the result of function
computation. We propose scheme that achieves the recovery threshold of 3t+ 2m− 1 workers, which is
order-wise less than the recovery threshold of the conventional methods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we state the problem formulation. In Section
III, we state the main result. In Section IV we define polynomial sharing. In Section V, we explain a new
method for multiplication of two matrices, which works for semi-honest setting. To make this scheme
work in the presence of malicious workers, we need some preliminaries and fault-tolerant subroutines,
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4including extended verifiable secret sharing explained in Section VI. Then, in Section VII, Section VIII
and Section IX, we explain the proposed MPC scheme in the presence of malicious workers, and prove
its correctness. Finally we prove the privacy of the proposed algorithm in Section X.
II. PROBLEM SETTING
We consider a system, including Γ sources, N processing nodes or workers and one data collector or
master. There is not any communication between sources but each source is connected to each of the
workers. Each source γ ∈ {1, 2, ...,Γ} has access to a matrix X[γ], where X[γ] is chosen independently and
uniformly at random from Fzγ×vγ , for some integers zγ and vγ and finite field F. We assume each worker
has access to a function of X[γ], with the size of 1mγ fraction of it size, for some integer mγ . There is a
point to point private link between each pair of workers. Also there is an authenticated broadcast channel
among all workers such that the identity of the broadcaster is known. All the workers are connected
to the master, which is interested in computing an arbitrary polynomial function of X[1],X[2], ...,X[Γ]
denoted by Y , G(X[1],X[2], ...,X[Γ]).
We assume that an arbitrary subset S = {s1, s2, . . . , st} of workers are malicious, for some integer
t ≤ N . It means that they can collude and share their data with each other. In addition malicious workers
may not follow the protocol. Indeed, they may do anything, including misleading the other workers, to
make the computation result incorrect.
Assume that all existing links are error-free and secure. In this system we follow a three-step solution
as follows:
1) Sharing: In this step, source γ sends X˜γ,j = Fγ,j(X[γ]) to the worker j, where Fγ,j(X) : Fzγ×uγ →
Fp×q, for some integer parameters p and q and j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. We defined 1mγ ,
pq
zγ×uγ as
normalized storage capacity of source γ to each worker. Thus, 1mγ is a real non-negative number
between 0 and 1.
2) Computation and Communication: Workers process their input data and communicate with each
other in this step. LetMn→n′ be the set of all messages that worker n′ receives from worker n in this
step, for some n, n′ ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. In the main protocol, for ease of understanding, computation
and communication step will be partitioned into 2 phases, subsharing phase, and constructing the
product of subshares phase.
3) Reconstruction: In this step, each worker n, n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, sends a message, denoted by
Yn to the master, such that the master is able to reconstruct Y = G(X[1],X[2], ...,X[Γ]) from
Y1,Y2, ...YN .
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5All schemes that are proposed in secure fault-tolerant MPC systems must satisfy some constraints
regarding, correctness, privacy for the workers, and privacy for the master, as follows.
• Correctness: Master must have sufficient information to derive the correct result. More precisely,
H(Y|Y1,Y2, ...,YN ) = 0. (1)
Note that the correctness condition must be satisfied in the presence of adversarial nodes.
• Privacy for the workers: Let t ∈ {1, ..., N}. If any arbitrary subset S = {s1, s2, ..., st} of workers
collude and share their data, they can not gain any information about the inputs, i.e.,
H(X[j], j ∈ {1, 2, ...,Γ}) = H(X[j], j ∈ {1, 2, ...,Γ}| ∪si∈S {Mn→si , n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}}, X˜γ,si ,
γ ∈ {1, 2, ...,Γ}, si ∈ S)
• Privacy for the master: Master must not gain any additional information beyond the function result,
i.e.,
H(X[1],X[2], ...,X[Γ]|Y,Y1,Y2, ...,YN ) = H(X[1],X[2], ...,X[Γ]|Y).
Fig. 1. An MPC system includes Γ sources, N processing nodes or workers, and one data collector or master. There is not any
communication between sources but each source is connected to each of the workers. Each source γ ∈ {1, 2, ...,Γ} has access
to a large-scale matrix X[γ]. We assume that each worker can store a function of X[γ], with the size of 1
mγ
fraction of it size for
some integer mγ . There is a point to point private link between each pair of workers. Also there is an authenticated broadcast
channel among all workers such that the identity of the broadcaster is known. All the workers are connected to the master, which
is interested in computing an arbitrary polynomial function of X[1],X[2], ...,X[Γ] denoted by Y , G(X[1],X[2], ...,X[Γ]).
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6Definition 1: Consider the secure MPC system, explained above, with t malicious workers and mγ =
m, for γ ∈ [Γ], and some integer m. The recovery threshold, denoted by N∗
t, 1
m
, is defined as the minimum
number of workers N , needed to calculate an arbitrary polynomial function of private inputs Y =
G(X[1],X[2], ...,X[Γ]), while satisfying the correctness condition, the privacy condition at the workers,
and the privacy condition at the data collector.
Remark 1: In this paper, the objective is to introduce an upper-bound on N∗
t, 1
m
, by developing an
achievable scheme for this problem.
Remark 2: The difference between this set-up and secure matrix multiplication [26]–[34] is that in
secure matrix multiplication, the master is interested in the result of multiplication of two matrices, or
multiple pairs of matrices, and there is no privacy constraint at the master. Also there is no communication
among the workers. Thus adversarial behavior of malicious workers can be detected and corrected using
schemes similar as what is used in Reed-Solomon decoding. However, in this paper, workers communicate
with each other to be able to calculate any polynomial function, rather than just matrix multiplication.
The challenge is then to prevent adversarial nodes to mislead other workers, and also prevent errors
propagating in the network.
Remark 3: The difference between this set-up and Lagrange coding [25] is that Lagrange code
is design to compute G(X1), . . . ,G(XΓ), for some polynomial function G and some input matrices
X1, . . . ,XΓ. In addition, each worker can handle computing one of these tasks. Lagrange code introduces
coded redundancy in executing those tasks. The algorithm can also protect privacy of data at the workers.
Lagrange codes is a single-shot scheme, without any interaction among the workers. The advantage thus
is that adversarial nodes can be handled at the master, following the same approaches used in Reed-
Solomon decoding. The disadvantage is that the recovery threshold grows linearly with the degree of G.
In contrary, in the proposed problem formulation here, workers can communicate with each other, and
thus the recovery threshold does not increase with the degree of polynomial. This makes dealing with
adversarial nodes more challenging.
III. MAIN RESULT
The objective is to calculate an arbitrary polynomial function G of the inputs. As explained in [12],
any arbitrary polynomial function can be implemented using a sequence of multiplication, addition,
and transposing gates. In this paper a new scheme called polynomial coded multi-party computation
is proposed, which order-wise reduces the recovery threshold as compared with conventional schemes.
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7In Section VII, we see how to compute the product of two matrices while the privacy and correctness
conditions have been satisfied. We state the main result in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Consider matrices X[1],X[2], ...,X[Γ] where X[γ] are chosen independently and uniformly
at random from Fk×k, for some integer k. Assume each worker can take a function of each input, with
the size of 1m fraction of that input matrix. The optimum recovery threshold to compute an arbitrary
polynomial function G(X[1],X[2], ...,X[Γ]) is upper-bounded by 2m+ 3t− 1.
Proof can be found in Section VII, which is based on the procedures, provided in the rest of the paper.
Remark 4: To the state of the art, the proposed scheme order-wise reduces the recovery threshold as
compared to conventional methods [11]. For example, consider a secure MPC system with t = m = 20.
Concatenating job splitting and conventional BGW scheme needs more than 1200 workers, while the
proposed scheme needs just 99 workers.
Remark 5: As it can be seen, the upper bound of the recovery threshold is a linear function of m and
t. The fact that the upper bound is a function of 3 times the number of adversarial nodes is a common
phenomenon in distributed systems with adversarial nodes.
Remark 6: Unlike secure matrix multiplication methods [26]–[34], the proposed scheme is not limited
to pair-wise multiplication of matrices. In addition, unlike Lagrange coded computing [25], the recovery
threshold does not increase with the degree of the polynomial. That is because in this setting, workers
can communicate each other, which raises new challenges, mentioned in the next remark.
Remark 7: The challenge that we face in this setting is that the errors of adversaries can propagate
through the entire system and even mislead the honest nodes and make the final result incorrect. In
addition, in interaction among the workers, there is the risk of leaking information about private inputs
to the workers. Therefore, we need to develop some subroutines that protect us against colluding or
malicious actions. For this reason, we introduce a new method of computation in Section V that can be
combined with some protecting subroutines, explained in Section VI, and resolve these challenges. For
the case where m = 1, this scheme reduces to BGW protocol [11].
IV. POLYNOMIAL SHARING
Definition 2: Consider matrix X ∈ Fz×v, for some z, v ∈ N, partitioned as
X =
[
X0,X1,X2, . . . ,Xm−1
]
, (2)
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8where Xi ∈ Fz× vm , i = 1, . . . ,m−1, for some m ∈ N where m|v. We define direct polynomial coded
matrix F(d)X,m,t,δ(x) and reverse polynomial coded matrix F
(r)
B,m,t,δ(x) as
F
(d)
X,m,t,δ(x) ,
m−1∑
j=0
Xjx
j +
t−1∑
q=0
Rqx
m+δ+q,
F
(r)
X,m,t,δ(x) ,
m−1∑
j=0
Xm−1−jxj +
t−1∑
q=0
Rˆqx
m+δ+q,
for some δ ∈ N∪{0} and q ∈ {0, 1, ..., t−1}, where Rq and Rˆq are chosen independently and uniformly
at random from Fz×
v
m .
Assume that each worker is assigned a distinct nonzero αn ∈ F, n ∈ [N ]. We say that X is shared
in the form of (m, t, δ, d)-share with worker n, if F(d)X,m,t,δ(αn) is sent to worker n. Similarly, we say
X is shared in the form of (m, t, δ, r)-share with worker n, if F(r)X,m,t,δ(αn) is sent to worker n. We call
F
(d)
X,m,t,δ(αn) and F
(r)
X,m,t,δ(αn) as shares of matrix X.
Here we have three properties: (1) It is shown that if X was shared in the form of (m, t, δ, d)-share
or (m, t, δ, r)-share with some workers, then if less than or equal to t workers collude, they gain no
information about X [14]. On the other hand, with the shares of t+m or more workers, we can recover
matrix X. (2) the size of F(d)X,m,t,δ(αn) and F
(r)
X,m,t,δ(αn) are
1
m fraction of the size of X, (3) this form
of sharing admits basic operations such as matrix multiplication and addition as we will show in the next
sections.
V. MULTIPLICATION OF TWO MATRICES IN SEMI-HONEST SETTING
As discussed in Section I, we are interested in computing an arbitrary polynomial of input matrices,
under some privacy constraints. In this section, we first focus on matrix multiplication, due to its major
role in the proposed scheme. However, for now we assume that up to t workers are semi-honest, rather
than adversary. Semi-honest nodes follow the protocol, but may collude to gain some information about
the inputs. This case has been addressed before in [12]–[14]. Here, we propose a different solution, that
can be modified to handle adversarial nodes, as it will be explained later in Section VII.
Assume that we have Γ = 2 input matrices, X[1] = A and X[2] = B. At the first step (m, t, 0, d)-share
of A and (m, t, 0, r)-share of B are sent to the workers. Finally, we want (m, t, 0, d)-share of C , ABT ,
or alternatively (m, t, 0, d)-share of C be available, at the workers. Having shares of C available at the
workers has two advantages: (1) These shares can be sent to the master, and it can recover file C, while
privacy at the master is held. (2) If our goal is to multiply C = ABT to another matrix, we will use the
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9same scheme again. Thus, we can calculate multiplication of any number of input matrices, and even
any polynomial of them, by iteratively using the same algorithm. This will be discussed later in details.
For simplicity, assume that A,B ∈ Fz×z . The steps of the algorithm is as follows:
1- Sharing phase: Source 1 shares A in the form of (m, t, 0, d)-share, and source 2 shares B in the
form of (m, t, 0, r)-share, with the workers. In other words, worker n has access to [A]n , A(αn) and
[B]n , B(αn), for some distinct αn ∈ F, where A(x) , F(d)A,m,t,0(x) and B(x) , F(r)B,m,t,0(x), for all
n ∈ [N ].
2- Subsharing phase: In this phase worker n subshares its shares as follows:
• Worker n shares [A]n, using a (1, t,m− 1, d)-sharing, with other workers. In other words, it forms
a polynomial as
An(x) , F(d)[A]n,1,t,m−1(x) = [A]n +
t∑
k=1
R
(n)
k x
m+k−1, (3)
where R(n)k , n ∈ [N ], k ∈ [t], are chosen independently and uniformly at random from Fz×
z
m . Then,
it sends An(αn′) to worker n′, for all n′ ∈ [N ].
• To subshare [B]n, worker n follows a different scheme. Worker n first partitions [B]n into m equal-
size matrices as
[B]n =

[B]n,0
[B]n,1
...
[B]n,m−1
 . (4)
Worker n shares [B]n,j in the form of (1, t,m− j− 1, d)-share, with other workers. In other words,
it forms
B(j)n (x) , F
(d)
[B]n,j ,1,t,m−j−1(x) = [B]n,j +
t∑
k=1
R
(n,j)
k x
m−j+k−1, (5)
where R(n,j)k , n ∈ [N ], j ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1}, k ∈ [t], are chosen independently and uniformly at
random from F
z
m
× z
m , and sends B(j)n (αn′) to worker n′, for all n′ ∈ [N ].
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Let us define Bn(x) as
Bn(x) ,
m−1∑
j=0
B(j)n (x)x
j =
m−1∑
j=0
xj
(
[B]n,j +
t∑
k=1
R
(n,j)
k x
m−j+k−1
)
(6)
=
m−1∑
j=0
[B]n,jx
j +
t∑
k=1
xm+k−1
m−1∑
j=0
R
(n,j)
k (7)
=
m−1∑
j=0
[B]n,jx
j +
t∑
k=1
xm+k−1R˜(n)k , (8)
where R˜(n)k ,
m−1∑
j=0
R
(n,j)
k . Thus, B
T
n (x) is indeed forms an (m, t, 0, d)-share of [B]
T
n . Finally, each
worker n′ computes Bn(αn′) =
m−1∑
j=0
αjn′B
(j)
n (αn′).
Remark 8: Note that worker n could have directly send Bn(αn′) to worker n′, rather than sending
B
(j)
n (αn′), j = 0, . . . ,m− 1. This two-step approach will be exploited later to deal with adversaria
3- Constructing the product of subshares: Up to here, each worker n has formed two polynomials
An(x) and Bn(x), and sends An(αn′) and Bn(αn′) to worker n′, for all n′ ∈ [N ]. In this phase, worker
n follows a certain procedure to form F(d)[A]n[B]Tn ,m,t,0(x), and sends F
(d)
[A]n[B]Tn ,m,t,0
(αn′) to worker n′,
n′ ∈ [N ]. We note that since [A]n and [B]Tn are available at worker n (from Phase 1), this worker
can directly form a polynomial in the form of F(d)[A]n[B]Tn ,m,t,0(x). However, for the reasons that will
be explained later, and to fight with adversarial nodes, worker n uses An(x) and Bn(x) to develop
F
(d)
[A]n[B]Tn ,m,t,0
(x), by following an indirect approach. For this purpose, worker n, n ∈ [N ], can find some
polynomials O(n)0 (x),O
(n)
1 (x), . . . ,O
(n)
m+t−2(x) of degree t such that
Cn(x) = An(x)B
T
n (x)−
m+t−2∑
`=0
xm+`O
(n)
` (x), (9)
forms a polynomial of degree m+t−1. One can see that Cn(x) is in the form of F(d)A(αn)BT (αn),m,t,0(x). In
what follows, we first show that it is possible to construct polynomials O(n)0 (x),O
(n)
1 (x), . . . ,O
(n)
m+t−2(x)
of degree t such that deg(Cn(x))=m+ t− 1.
Let us partition [A]n[B]Tn into m equal size matrices as
[A]n[B]
T
n = [{[A]n[B]Tn}1, {[A]n[B]Tn}2, . . . , {[A]n[B]Tn}m−1]. (10)
First, one can see that the coefficient of xj in (9) is {[A]n[B]Tn}j for all j, 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1. This can be
verified by calculating An(x)Bn(x) directly and in each polynomial xm+`O
(n)
` (x), 0 ≤ ` ≤ m+ t− 2,
the degree of each term is at least m.
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To construct O(n)` (x), we use the following scheme. Let us show An(x)Bn(x) as follows.
An(x)B
T
n (x) = D
(n)
0 +D
(n)
1 x+D
(n)
2 x
2 + · · ·+D(n)2t+2m−2x2t+2m−2. (11)
Then, worker n chooses O(n)m+t−2(x) as
O
(n)
m+t−2(x) = Rm+t−2,0 +Rm+t−2,1x+Rm+t−2,t−1x
t−1 +D(n)2t+2m−2x
t,
where Rm+t−2,0, . . . ,Rm+t−2,t−1 are chosen independently and uniformly at random from Fz×
z
m . This
makes us sure that in Cn(x) (see (9)), the coefficient of x2m+2t−2 is zero.
Then worker n chooses O(n)m+t−3(x), as
O
(n)
m+t−3(x) = Rm+t−3,0 +Rm+t−3,1x+ · · ·+Rm+t−3,t−1xt−1 + (D(n)2t+2m−3 −Rm+t−2,t−1)xt,
where Rm+t−3,0, . . . ,Rm+t−3,t−1xt−1 are chosen are independently and uniformly at random from
Fz×
z
m . This makes us sure that in Cn(x) (see (9)), the coefficient of x2m+2t−3 is zero. Using the
same procedure recursively, we can find other polynomials as follows.
O
(n)
m+t−4(x) = Rm+t−4,0 +Rm+t−4,1x+ . . .+Rm+t−4,t−1x
t−1
+ (D
(n)
2t+2m−4 −Rm+t−3,t−1 −Rm+t−2,t−2)xt,
...
O
(n)
0 (x) = R0,0 +R0,1x+ · · ·+R0,t−1xt−1 + (D(n)t+1 −R1,t−1 − · · · −Rt,0)xt,
where Ri,j are chosen independently and uniformly at random from Fz×
z
m and D(n)` (x) are the coefficients
of the expansion of An(x)BTn (x) shown in (11).
One can easily verify that with the above choices of O(n)0 (x),O
(n)
1 (x), . . . ,O
(n)
m+t−2(x), then Cn(x)
is of degree m+ t− 1, and it can be written as
Cn(x) =
m−1∑
`=0
{[A]n[B]Tn}`x` +
t∑
k=1
Z
(n)
k x
m+k−1, (12)
where Z(n)k has uniform distribution in F
z× z
m , independent from [A]n[BT ]n. Thus Cn(x) is in the form
of F(d)[A]n[B]Tn ,m,t,0(x).
Then worker n sends O(n)0 (αn′),O
(n)
1 (αn′), . . . ,O
(n)
m+t−2(αn′) to worker n
′, n′ ∈ N . Thus each worker
n′ can form Cn(α′n) using (9), and using the fact that it has access to An(αn′) and Bn(αn′) from Phase
2 and O(n)0 (αn′),O
(n)
1 (αn′), . . . , O
(n)
m+t−2(αn′) from this phase.
4- Constructing shares of product: First we need to express an important theorem from [12].
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Theorem 2. Consider an arbitrary polynomial F(x) =
k∑
i=0
Cix
i of degree k. Assume that we have the
value of F(x) at some points a1, a2, . . . , aM ∈ F. We can write any coefficient of polynomial F(x) as a
linear combination of F(a1),F(a2), . . . ,F(an) if and only if M ≥ k + 1.
As it was shown in Theorem 2, if N ≥ 2m+ 2t− 1 there exist λ1, λ2, ..., λN ∈ F such that
N∑
n=1
λn[A]n[B]
T
n = C. (13)
In this phase, each worker n′, n′ ∈ [N ], calculates ∑Nn=1 λnCn(α′n).
We note that
N∑
n=1
λnCn(x)
(a)
=
N∑
n=1
λn
m−1∑
`=0
{[A]n[B]Tn}`x` +
N∑
n=1
λn
t∑
k=1
Z
(n)
k x
m+k−1
=
m−1∑
`=0
x`
N∑
n=1
λn{[A]n[B]Tn}` +
t∑
k=1
xm+k−1
N∑
n=1
λnZ
(n)
k
(b)
=
m−1∑
`=0
x`C` +
t∑
k=1
xm+k−1Z˜(n)k ,
where (a) follows from (12) and (b) follows from (13) and also C = ABT = [C0, . . . ,Cm−1]. In the
above equation Z˜(n)k ,
∑N
n=1 λnZ
(n)
k . Thus,
∑N
n=1 λnCn(x) forms F
(d)
C,m,t,0(x), and each worker n has
F
(d)
C,m,t,0(αn). This is what we were looking for.
In the above algorithm, if we have adversarial nodes, then in each phase, an adversarial node n can
send wrong information to the other nodes and make the entire algorithm to fail. To take into account the
challenges that we face, when we have adversarial behavior and provide the solution which is resistance
to this behavior, we need to introduce four subroutines which will be developed in the next section. Then
in Section VII, we will propose modified version of the algorithm presented in this section, relying on
subroutines that we introduce in Section VI.
VI. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we extend some of the existing subroutines used in multi-party computation to be able
to apply to the proposed scheme for computing an arbitrary polynomial of input matrices.
A. Extended Verifiable Secret Sharing
A procedure to share a secret s by a dealer, among some nodes or shareholders in such a way that any
fewer than or equal to t of colluding nodes cannot gain any information about secret s, while any set
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of honest nodes more than some threshold can recover the secret is called secret sharing. Secret sharing,
first, was introduced by Shamir [36] and Blakley [37], independently, in 1979.
Secret sharing is a basic tool in cryptography and has been used in many applications such as e-
voting schemes, crypto-currencies and access control systems. In Shamir secret sharing, the dealer uses
the secret as the constant term of a polynomial of degree t, where the other coefficients are chosen
randomly and uniformly from the field. Then the dealer sends the value of this polynomial at different
points to different nodes, as their shares. It can be shown that, this scheme is information theoretically
secure. In this scheme, we assume that the dealer is trusted and always sends consistent shares to the
other nodes, i.e., it chooses points on a polynomial of degree t. In some applications, the dealer may be
corrupted. In this case, we need a mechanism to be able to verify the consistency of the shares. Chor et
al. [38] introduce verifiable secret sharing (VSS), which enables nodes to confirm whether their shares are
consistent or not. The work of [38] has been followed by many other results, which can be categorized
into two major approaches.
1) Computational VSS scheme: In this case, we assume that adversaries have bounded computing
power that limits their ability to solve some mathematical problems with extensive complexity,
such as finding prime divisors of a large composite number. Some examples of computational VSS
can be found in [15], [39].
2) Information theoretically secure VSS scheme: In this case, we do not limit the adversaries in term of
computational power or storage size. Those kinds of systems are information-theoretically secure,
i.e., the security holds, even if the adversary has unbounded computing power, such as [40]–[42].
Here, we propose an extended verifiable secret sharing, as an extended version of VSS [38], that has
the following properties:
1) If the dealer is malicious, and the shares that it sends to the other nodes are not consistent, i.e., are
not some points on a polynomial of specified degree, the honest nodes in collaboration with each
other will realize that and reject the shares.
2) If the dealer is honest, then the malicious workers cannot deceive the honest nodes and convince
them that the dealer is malicious, and thus each honest node accepts its share.
In its original form [11], to share a secret s from a field F, the dealer chooses a bivariate polynomial
S(x, y), uniformly at random from the set of all bivariate polynomials of degree t, with respect to each
of the variables x and y, with coefficients from F, subject to S(0, 0) = s. Then the dealer sends S(x, αn)
and S(αn, y) to the worker n, for all n ∈ [N ] and some distinct αn ∈ F. The redundancy in this scheme,
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allows honest workers to verify the consistency of shares through communication with other workers.
We do not explain the algorithm of VSS. The reader can read it in details in [43]. Here we explain
the proposed scheme where in some special cases it reduces to the verifiable secret sharing. Briefly, the
proposed scheme works as follows. The full protocol of EVSS is explained in details in Algorithm 1.
Let us assume that the dealer has a matrix W, partitioned equally in m sub-matrices, as W =
[W0,W1, . . . ,Wm−1]. We also assume that the dealer forms a polynomial Q(z) ,
m−1∑
j=0
Wjx
j +
t∑
k=1
Rkx
m+δ+k−1 where Rk, k = 0, . . . t − 1, are chosen independently and uniformly at random. It
plans (or simply pretends) to send Q(αn) to node n. In a (W,m, t, δ) − EVSS algorithm, the dealer
embeds the polynomial Q(z) into a bivariate polynomial S(x, y). This means that it forms S(x, y)
of degree m + t + δ − 1 with respect to each variable, such that S(0, z) = Q(z). Other coefficients
of S(x, y) are chosen independently and uniformly at random. Then, the dealer sends worker n two
univariate polynomials fn(x) = S(x, αn) and gn(y) = S(αn, y) as intermediate shares, for all n ∈ [N ].
This approach introduces some redundancy and allows the nodes for verification. One can see that
∀n, n′ ∈ [N ], n 6= n′, we have fn(αn′) = gn′(αn). This property is used to verify the consistency of
share as follows. Each pair of workers (i, j), send the values fi(αj), gi(αj), fj(αi) and gj(αi) to each
other. Then each of them can verify that either their univariate polynomials (intermediate shares) are
pairwise consistent, i.e. fi(αj) = gj(αi) and fj(αi) = gi(αj) or not. If it is not, e.g., worker n receives
values fn′(αn) and gn′(αn) from worker n′ and fn(αn′) 6= gn′(αn) or fn′(αn) 6= gn(αn′), worker n will
broadcast a complaint massage including (n, n′, fn(αn′), gn(αn′)). In this case, the dealer examines
that if these values are correct, then reveals nothing, else it broadcasts the entire polynomials fn(x) and
gn(y). Now all the other parties can verify that these new polynomials are consistent with their shares
or not. If it is, they broadcast consistent. There must be at least N − t workers which broadcast
consistent to accept that the dealer is not malicious and the polynomials are correct.
As we shall see in Algorithm 1, this method prevents the dealer to distribute non-consistent shares.
Finally each node n derives fn(0) = S(0, αn) = Q(αn) as its polynomial share.
Remark 9: Whenever the dealer constructs S(x, y) such that, S(0, z) = Q(z) and shares S(x, y)
using the following EVSS scheme, we say that the dealer shares Q(z).
Remark 10: For some special cases, EVSS reduces to the conventional VSS. In particular (s, 1, t, 0)−
EVSS is the same as VSS to share s.
Theorem 3. Let K ⊂ [N ] be a set of integers and {fk(x), gk(y)}k∈K be a set of pairs of polynomials of
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degree m′ where |K| ≥ m′ + 1. And let {αk}k∈K be some distinct non-zero elements in F. If for every
i, j ∈ K, fi(αj) = gj(αi), then there exists a unique bivariate polynomial S(x, y) of degree m′ with
respect to each of the variables such that fk(x) = S(x, αk) and gk(y) = S(αk, y) for every k ∈ K.
Proof: See [43].
Remark 11: The above theorem implies that, if in an EVSS invocation there exists some honest
workers i1, i2, . . . , im+δ+t such that for each pair of them like iu and iv, their shares are consistent, i.e.,
fiu(αiv) = giv(αiu) and fiv(αiu) = giu(αiv), then there exists exactly one bivariate polynomial S(x, y)
such that S(x, αil) = fil(αil) and S(αil , x) = gil(αil), for all l ∈ [m+ δ + t].
Theorem 4. Assume that N ≥ 3t+m.
1) If the dealer is honest and follows Algorithm 1 to invoke (W, p,m, t)−EVSS using S(x, y) such that
S(0, z) = Q(z), then each honest worker i, who follows Algorithm 1, will accept fi(0) = Q(αi),
as its share.
2) If the dealer is malicious, either it follows Algorithm 1 and each honest node i, correctly admits
fi(0) as its verified share of the secret, or all of them reject it, and output ⊥.
Proof:
1) First, consider the case where the dealer is honest, i.e., it follows Algorithm 1. Thus for any i,j in
the set of all honest workers, fi(αj) = gj(αi) and gi(αj) = fj(αi).
Assume that node i is honest and node j is corrupted. If the corrupted worker j, in Step 2 of
Algorithm 1, sends incorrect values instead of (fj(αi), gj(αi)) to the honest worker i, then the
honest node i, broadcasts a complaint message as explained in Step 3 of Algorithm 1. Recall
that the complaint message includes (i, j, fi(αj), gi(αj)), where fi(αj) and gi(αj) are the correct
values of gj(αi) and fj(αi). However node j, which is corrupted, already has access to these values,
therefore broadcasting this information by node i does not reveal anything new. On top of that,
since these values are correct, the dealer will not reveal the polynomials of the honest worker, i.e.,
fi(x) and gi(x).
On the other hand, if a malicious worker sends a complaint message, including incorrect values,
then the honest dealer will reveal its polynomials. Note that these polynomials have been revealed to
an adversary before, and broadcasting it by the dealer does not reveal anything new. When this case
occurs, all honest parties verify consistency of revealed polynomials and broadcast consistent.
Thus at least N − t workers broadcast consistent message in Step 5. Finally, each honest node
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i accepts fi(0) as its share, according to Algorithm 1.
2) Next, assume that the dealer is malicious. In this case, two honest workers i and j may receive
polynomials that are not consistent with each other, i.e., fi(αj) 6= gj(αi) or gi(αj) 6= fj(αi). In
this case, since both of the honest workers broadcast conflicting complaint messages, then the
dealer is forced to response by at least a valid reveal message containing of shares of worker i
or j in Step 4 of Algorithm 1. If all the revealed messages are consistent with intermediate shares
of other honest workers, then they broadcast consistent messages in Step 5. Else, they will not
broadcast consistent. There must be at least N − t workers which broadcast consistent
to accept that the shares are consistent, else, all honest nodes output ⊥. If there are at least N − t
consistence messages, then there are at least (N − t)− t honest workers among who broadcast
consistent in Step 5 (Among at least N − t workers that broadcast consistent, there are
at most t malicious workers, thus there are at least N − t − t honest nodes among them). If
N ≥ 3t+m, then it implies that there exist at least m+ t honest workers, such that their shares
are pairwise consistent with each other. Therefore as a result of Theorem 3, their polynomials are
received from a unique bivariate polynomial S(x, y) of degree m+ t− 1. Assume that there exists
an honest worker k, such that its polynomial, say fk(x) is not equal with S(x, αk). Since at least
m + t honest workers verify that fk(αj) = S(αj , αk) and deg(fk(x))≤ m + t − 1, then we can
conclude that the polynomial fk(x) is unique and obtained from S(x, y). Thus fk(x) is consistent
with other shares, and each honest node i admits fi(0) as a verified share of the secret.
The procedure in Algorithm 1 is similar to the verifiable secret sharing algorithm in [44] except that
in first step we may put data in more than one coefficient. To capture that coding more than one matrices
simultaneously in just one polynomial. As a result of that, the threshold here is different from the threshold
of the conventional VSS.
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Algorithm 1: Extended Verifiable Secret Sharing
Initializing: The dealer D = P0 holds a secret input W = [W0,W1, . . . ,Wm−1], where Wj ∈ Fe×r,
for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1}. The field F and N non-zero elements α1, α2, . . . , αN ∈ F are known to
all nodes.
The protocol:
1) Sending shares by the dealer:
a) The dealer forms a bivariate polynomial S(x, y) =
m+t−1∑
j=0
m+t−1∑
i=0
Si,jx
iyj such that S0,j = Wj
for all 0 ≤ j ≤ m − 1 and Si,j , are selected independently and uniformly at random from
Fe×r, for all i 6= 0 or m ≤ j .
b) For every i ∈ [N ], the dealer sends fi(x) , S(x, αi) and gi(y) , S(αi, y) to each party Pi.
2) storing and exchanging subshares by each party Pi:
a) Party Pi keeps the polynomials fi(x) and gi(y), received from the dealer.
b) Party Pi sends fi(αj) and gi(αj) to party Pj , j ∈ [N ].
3) broadcasting complaints by each party Pi:
a) Party Pi stores uj , fj(αi) and vj , gj(αi), where fj(αi) and gj(αi) are received from party
Pj . If uj 6= gi(αj) or vj 6= fi(αj), party Pi broadcasts complaint(i, j, fi(αj), gi(αj)).
b) If no complaint is broadcasted by any of the parties, then party Pi stores fi(0) as the
verified share and halts.
4) resolving complaints by the dealer: For every complaint message received, the dealer does
the following:
a) When the dealer receives a complaint message complaint(i, j, u, v) which is broadcasted
by Pi, it verifies that u = S(αj , αi) and v = S(αi, αj). If at least one of these equations is
incorrect, then it broadcasts reveal(i, fi(x), gi(y)), otherwise, it does nothing.
5) evaluating complaint resolutions by each party Pi:
a) (j, k) is known as joint complaint if two complaint messages, complaint(k, j, u1, v1)
and complaint(j, k, u2, v2) broadcasted simultaneously by Pk and Pj , respectively. If in the
response of joint complaint(j, k) the dealer broadcasts at least one of reveal(k, fk(x)
, gk(y)) or reveal(j, fj(x), gj(y)), then party Pi goes to the next step otherwise, it goes to
Step 6.
b) First party Pi considers all reveal messages sent by the dealer:
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i) If there exist a reveal(j, fj(x), gj(y)) message such that j = i, then party Pi replaces
the new polynomials fj(x) and gj(y) with the stored ones. Then it goes to Step 6.
ii) If there exists a reveal message in the set which was not consistent with Pi shares, i.e.,
there exist reveal
(j, fj(x), gj(y)) with j 6= i such that fi(αj) 6= gj(αi) or gi(αj) 6= fj(αi), then it goes to
Step 6.
For each party Pi, if there is not a message in the set that satisfies at least one of the above
conditions, then it broadcasts consistent.
c) Party Pi broadcasts the message consistent.
6) if there is complaints - each party Pi: If at least N − t parties broadcast consistent, each
party Pi outputs fi(0). Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
April 13, 2020 DRAFT
19
B. Multiplication of Shares By a Matrix
Assume that each worker n has a private value xn and all parties need to know the product of
x = [x1, x2, . . . , xN ] and an arbitrary matrix H ∈ FN×m where the privacy constraints is preserved. It
means that each worker n learns nothing about xn′ , n′ 6= n, n′ ∈ [N ] beyond xH. The privacy constraints
can be written formally similar to what stated in the problem formulation in Section II. This scheme
is called multiplication of shares by a matrix which is explained in [43]. To be self-contained, here we
review the scheme.
To do this, first node n uses (xn, 1, t, δ)−EVSS where δ ∈ N, to share xn, using a bivariate polynomial
denoted by Sn(x, y). We define Qn(z) = Sn(0, z). According to EVSS, Qn(0) = xn. For now, assume
that in this subsection, each node n shares the correct value of xn. Later, in Subsection VI-C, we will
discuss the case where some of the nodes do not share the correct values. Then each worker n′ has
access to Q1(αn′), Q2(αn′), . . . , QN (αn′) for all n′ ∈ [N ]. Node n′ computes [Q1(αn′), Q2(αn′), . . .
, QN (αn′)]H , [yn′,1, yn′,2, . . . , yn′,m], and sends [y˜n′,1, y˜n′,2, . . . , y˜n′,m] to node n for all n ∈ [N ],
where if Node n′ is honest [y˜n′,1, y˜n′,2, . . . , y˜n′,m] is equal to [yn′,1, yn′,2, . . . , yn′,m], otherwise, it can
be anything. Different nodes may receive different vector from node n′, if it is corrupted. Let us define
matrix Y and Q as follows.
Y ,

y1,1 y1,2 . . . y1,m
y2,1 y2,2 . . . y2,m
y3,1 y3,2 . . . y3,m
...
...
. . .
...
yN,1 yN,2 . . . yN,m

, (14)
Q ,

Q1(α1) Q2(α2) . . . QN (α1)
Q1(α2) Q2(α2) . . . QN (α2)
...
...
. . .
...
Q1(αN ) Q2(αN ) . . . QN (αN )
 . (15)
Thus
Y = QH. (16)
Ideally, each node has matrix Y, however, because of adversarial behaviour, in reality each node has
Y˜ as follows.
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Y˜ ,

y˜1,1 y˜1,2 . . . y˜1,m
y˜2,1 y˜2,2 . . . y˜2,m
y˜3,1 y˜3,2 . . . y˜3,m
...
...
. . .
...
y˜N,1 y˜N,2 . . . y˜N,m

For each honest node i, ith row of matrix Y˜ is equal to ith row of matrix Y. Let us define Y(x) =
[Y1(x),Y2(x), . . . ,Ym(x)] , [Q1(x), Q2(x), . . . , QN (x)]H. Obviously, Yi(x) is of degree k , t +
δ. Column i of matrix Y, consisting of N points on a polynomial of degree k, is a Reed-Solomon
Code [45] of Yi(x). Reed-Solomon Codes are a kind of Maximum Distance Separable codes and meets
Singleton bound [46]. Thus by using Reed-Solomon decoding procedure, workers can correct up to N−k2
errors in each column. Since the number of malicious adversaries is at most t, so we need to have
N−k
2 > t. Note that N ≥ 2t + k = 3t + δ and in our procedure δ is less than m. Thus, it is sufficient
that N ≥ 3t + m. If N ≥ 3t + m each worker can recover Y(x) = [Y1(x),Y2(x), . . . ,Ym(x)] =
[Q1(x), Q2(x), . . . , QN (x)]H. So it can compute [Q1(0), Q2(0), . . . , QN (0)]H which is equal to xTH.
This procedure can be found in Algorithm 2, and is used in Subsection VI-C to verify that each node
shares the correct private input. The proof of the privacy of the procedure is postponed to Section X.
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Algorithm 2: Multiplication of Shares By a Matrix
Initializing: Each node n holds a polynomial Qn(x), where Qn(0) = xn. A field F, a matrix H ∈
FN×m, and n non-zero elements α1, α2, . . . , αN ∈ F are known to all nodes.
The protocol:
1) Each node n sends Qn(αn′) to node n′ for all n, n′ ∈ [N ], using (xn, 1, t, 0)− EVSS.
2) Each node n′ stores Q(αn′) , [Q1(αn′), Q2(αn′), . . . , QN (αn′)]. If any of these entities is equal
to ⊥, it will be replaced with 0.
3) Each honest node n computes Y(αn) , Q(αn)H and then sends Y(αn) to node n′ for all
n, n′ ∈ [N ].
4) Node n′ received Y˜(αn) from node n (If node n is honest, Y˜(αn) is equal to Y(αn), else, it is
an arbitrary vector).
5) Each node n′ constructs matrix Y˜n′ , [Y˜(α1), Y˜(α2), . . . , Y˜(αN )]T . It uses Reed-Solomon
decoding on each column of matrix Y˜n′ to recover vector [Y(α1),Y(α2), . . . ,Y(αN )], and then
computes Y(x) = [Q1(x), Q2(x), . . . , QN (x)]H, which enables it to compute Y(0) , Q(0)H =
[x1, x2, . . . , xN ]H.
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C. Subshare of shares in the form of (F(αn), 1, t, ζ − 1)− EVSS
Consider a polynomial F(x) of degree p where p ≥ t. Assume that each node n has access to F(αn)
as its private share. The goal is that each node n is delivered a share of F(α′n) from node n′, i.e, node n
has access to Q1(αn),Q2(αn), . . . ,QN (αn), such that Qn′(x) = F(αn′) +R1,n′xζ +R2,n′xζ+1 + · · ·+
Rt,n′x
ζ+t−1, where R1,n′ ,R2,n′ , . . . ,Rt,n′ are chosen independently and uniformly at random, and ζ is
some integer, for all n, n′ ∈ [N ]. In this system, at most t of the nodes are malicious adversary. Our
goal is to make sure that the sharing is done correctly, otherwise, the honest nodes identify the malicious
nodes and omit them from the remaining part of computations. We will show that if the total number of
nodes is grater than 2t+ p, we can reach to this goal.
Assume that each node n holds a value F(αn) as its private share, which is sampled from a polynomial
F(x) =
p∑
i=0
ηix
i. In this subsection, the aim is that each worker re-shares its share with all other
nodes, using (F(αn), 1, t, ζ − 1) − EVSS, by constructing a bivariate polynomial Sn(x, y) such that
Qn(z) , Sn(0, z) = F(αn) +R1,nxζ +R2,nxζ+1 + · · ·+Rt,nxζ+t−1, for some t, ζ ∈ N. Note that the
coefficient of x` is 0 for all ` ∈ [ζ − 1].
In a semi-honest setting, it is not complicated to reach this goal. Because there exists no malicious
node and each node n can make polynomial Qn(x) , F(αn) +R1,nxζ +R2,nxζ+1 + · · ·+Rt,nxζ+t−1,
and sends Qn(αn′) to node n′. However, in our scenario, there exist some malicious nodes and we need
to force them to share the correct value in a correct polynomial form, otherwise, it will be eliminated. To
detect and correct any malicious behavior in the process of sharing, we propose the following procedure.
We want to verify that the constant term of Qn(x) is the correct share, i.e., sampled from a degree p
polynomial, and they are shared via a polynomial of degree ζ+ t− 1 where the coefficient of xl is equal
to zero for l ∈ [ζ − 1].
In addition this algorithm satisfies some privacy constraints. At this point we will not talk about those
properties. Later when we use this algorithm as a subroutine in the main procedure, we will show that
it does not violate the privacy constraints that we are looking for.
Each worker n can use (F(αn), 1, t, ζ − 1)− EVSS to share F(αn). Using EVSS ensures other nodes
that the degree of the polynomial is equal to ζ + t− 1. Now we aim to satisfy two additional conditions
for each node n which EVSS can not provide it alone. Each node n need to verify that:
1) The constant term of Sn′(0, z) is exactly F(αn′), for n′ ∈ [N ].
2) In Sn′(0, z) = Qn′(z) the coefficient of xj is zero, for j ∈ [ζ − 1].
Otherwise, it will announce node n′ as an adversary node.
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Let G ∈ F(t+1)×N be the generator matrix of polynomial F(x) =
p∑
i=0
ηix
i, i.e.,
G ,

α01 α
0
2 α
0
3 . . . α
0
N
α11 α
1
2 α
1
3 . . . α
1
N
α21 α
2
2 α
2
3 . . . α
2
N
...
...
...
. . .
...
αp1 α
p
2 α
p
3 . . . α
p
N

.
One can see that, G is a generator for a Reed-Solomon code of length N , dimension p + 1, with
the minimum distance d = N − p. For this code, there exists a parity-check matrix H ∈ F(d−1)×N
of rank d − 1 which is determined by α1, α2, . . . , αN such that GHT = 0(p+1)×(d−1). Let us define
β , [F(α1),F(α2), . . . ,F(αN )]. One can see that βHT = [η0, η1, . . . , ηp]GHT = 0(t+1)×(d−1). For
every error vector e ∈ {0, 1}N , we have (β + e)H = eH. If Hamming distance of e is at most d2 from
~0, it is possible to detect and correct the errors. Since there exist at most t malicious adversaries, we
need to have N−p2 =
d
2 > t. In our scheme, the maximum value of p is m + t − 1. So it is enough to
have N ≥ 3t+m. By using multiplication of shares with matrix HT as it was explained in the previous
subsection, we can compute the product of β and H which ideally is equal to ~0. To do this, we ask each
node n to re-share its share using a polynomial in the form of Qn(z) = F(αn) +R1,nxζ +R2,nxζ+1 +
· · ·+Rt,nxζ+t−1 using (F(αn), 1, t, ζ − 1)− EVSS. Therefore, similar to the previous subsection, each
node n′ has access to [Q1(αn′),Q2(αn′), . . . ,QN (αn′)]. Then, it computes [Yn′,1,Yn′,2, . . . ,Yn′,d−1] ,
[Q1(αn′),Q2(αn′), . . . ,QN (αn′)]H
T and sends [Y˜n′,1, Y˜n′,2, . . . , Y˜n′,d−1] to all other nodes. Similar to
the previous subsection, by Reed-Solomon decoding, each node can derive Y(x) = [Y1(x),Y2(x), . . .
,Ym(x)] , [Q1(x), Q2(x), . . . , QN (x)]HT . So it can compute [Q1(0), Q2(0), . . . , QN (0)]H which is
ideally equal to βHT = ~0. If it is not equal to ~0, then honest nodes can identify malicious workers.
Up to here, we are sure that the correct value is re-shared. Now the turn is to verify that the polynomial
Qn(z) has the valid form, meaning the coefficient of xj is zero, for j ∈ [ζ − 1]. For each honest node
n, generator matrix G˜ of polynomial Qn(z) is as follows.
G˜ ,

α01 α
0
2 α
0
3 . . . α
0
N
αζ1 α
ζ
2 α
ζ
3 . . . α
ζ
N
αζ+11 α
ζ+1
2 α
ζ+1
3 . . . α
ζ+1
N
...
...
...
. . .
...
αζ+t−11 α
ζ+t−1
2 α
ζ+t−1
3 . . . α
ζ+t−1
N

(17)
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There exists a parity-check matrix H˜ for this generator matrix. Since each node n′ has a private value
Qn(αn′) and has access to H˜, they can invoke multiplication of shares [Qn(α1),Qn(α2), . . . ,Qn(αN )]
by matrix H˜T . If the result is ~0, then the form of Qn(z) can be verified, otherwise, it means that the
generator matrix does not follow the format of (17). Later we will use this subroutine in the process of
calculating an arbitrary polynomial. We show that when we use this algorithm, it does not violate the
privacy constraints, stated in the problem formulation, in Section II.
Algorithm 3: Subshare of shares
Initializing. Let α1, α2, . . . , αN ∈ F be n distinct non-zero elements of F known to all nodes. In addition
p ∈ N is an integers known to every one. Each node n holds F(αn), where F(x) is a polynomial of degree
p. Let G be a generator matrix where gi,j = α
j
i , and H ∈ F2k×N be the corresponding parity-check
matrix. Each node also knows the value of ζ and deg(F(x)).
1) Each node n constructs a polynomial Qn(x) , F(αn) +R1,nxζ +R2,nxζ+1 + · · ·+Rt,nxζ+t−1,
where Ri,n, i ∈ [t], are chosen independently and uniformly at random from the field.
2) Each node n invokes Algorithm 2, using Qn(x) and H as inputs to the algorithm. Each node n
recovers Q1(αn),Q2(αn), . . . ,QN (αn) and [Q1(0),Q2(0), . . . ,QN (0)]H which is equal to eH,
where e is the error vector (error happens if Qn′(0) 6= F(αn′), for some n′ ∈ [N ]). Thus, by
running Reed-Solomon decoding procedure, it can obtain error vector e.
Algorithm 4: Subshare of shares in the form of (F(αn), 1, t, ζ − 1)− EVSS
Initializing. Let α1, α2, . . . , αN ∈ F be n distinct non-zero elements of F known to all nodes. Each
node n has Q1(αn),Q2(αn), . . . ,QN (αn) from Algorithm 3. In addition ζ ∈ N is an integers known to
every one. Let G˜ be a generator matrix of polynomial Qn(x), and H˜ be the corresponding parity-check
matrix.
For each n, all nodes do the following steps:
1) Each node n′ constructs a polynomial Tn′(x) , Qn(αn′) +R′1,n′x1 +R′2,n′x2 + · · ·+R′t,n′xt,
where R′i,n′ , i ∈ [t], are chosen independently and uniformly at random from the field.
2) Each node n′ invokes Algorithm 2, using Tn(x) and H˜ as inputs to the algorithm. Each node
n′ recovers T1(αn′),T2(αn′), . . . ,TN (αn′) and computes [T1(0),T2(0), . . . ,TN (0)]H which is
equal to ~0, otherwise, node n is eliminated from the remaining part of the algorithm.
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D. Evaluating a shared polynomial
To be able to verify the multiplication of shares in Section VII, nodes need to investigate complaints.
To do this, nodes need to be able to evaluate shared polynomials at any predetermined point α. Consider
a polynomial F(x) of degree p. Each node n has access to F(αn) as its private share. All nodes aim to
compute F(α) in collaboration with each other for an arbitrary α without revealing anything beyond that,
about their secrets. In this system, at most t of the nodes are malicious. Honest nodes want to identify any
malicious behavior and omit identified malicious nodes from the remaining stages of computation. We
will show that if the total number of nodes is equal or grater than max(3t, t+ p+ 1), we can reach this
goal. In this functionality we use nodes which are not already determined as a malicious node. Without
loss of generality, we assume that nodes 1, 2, . . . , N ′ are not identified as malicious so far.
First, by invoking Subshare of F(αn) in the form of (F(αn), 1, t, 0) − EVSS, each honest node n
subshares its private input F(αn) using Qn(x) = F(αn)+R1,nxζ +R2,nxζ+1 + · · ·+Rt,nxζ+t−1, where
R1,n,R2,n, . . . ,Rt,n are chosen independently and uniformly at random, and sends Qn(αn′) to node n′,
for some t, ζ ∈ N and n, n′ ∈ [N ′]. Hence each node n′ has access to Q1(αn′),Q2(αn′), . . . ,QN ′(αn′).
By Theorem 2, if N ′ > deg(F(x)) = p, there exist some λ1, λ2, . . . , λN ′ such that F(α) =
N ′∑
i=1
λiF(αi).
Each node n computes Q(x) =
N ′∑
i=1
λiQi(x) at point αn, i.e., Q(αn) =
N ′∑
i=1
λiQi(αn), and then sends it
to each node n′ ∈ [N ′]. Each node n′ receives Q˜(α1), Q˜(α2), . . . , Q˜(αN ′). If node n is honest, Q˜(αn)
is equal with Q(αn). Note that if a node is malicious, it can send different values to different nodes. One
can see that [Q˜(α1), Q˜(α2), . . . , Q˜(αN ′)] is a Reed-Solomon code of distance N ′− t which can correct
up to N
′−t
2 errors. Since there exist at most t malicious nodes, we need to
N ′−t
2 > t on N
′ > 3t. Thus,
by using Reed-Solomon decoding, each node can reconstruct Q(x), where Q(0) = F(α).
Algorithm 5: Evaluating a shared polynomial
Initializing. Each node n holds a value F(αn), where F(x) is a polynomial of degree p. N non-
zero distinct elements α1, α2, . . . , αN ∈ F are known to all nodes. For simplicity assume that nodes
{1, 2, . . . , N ′} are not identified as malicious so far.
The protocol:
1) Each honest node n subshares its private input F(αn) by invoking subshare of shares algorithm and
sends Qn(αn′) to node n′ where Qn(0) = F(αn). Construction of Qn(x) is explaind in previous
subsection.
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2) There exist some λ1, λ2, . . . , λN ′ ∈ F such that F(α) =
N ′∑
i=1
λiF(αi). Each node n computes
Q(αn) =
i=N ′∑
i=1
λiQi(αn) and broadcasts it to all other nodes.
3) Each node n′ receives Q˜(α1), Q˜(α2), . . . , Q˜(αN ′). Missing values are replaced by 0. Each party
runs Reed-Solomon decoding on possibly corrupted codewords [Q˜(α1), Q˜(α2), . . . , Q˜(αN ′)] and
corrects the possible errors and reconstructs [Q(α1),Q(α2), . . . , Q(αN ′)]. Then this node recon-
structs Q(x), where Q(0) = F(α).
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VII. MULTIPLICATION OF TWO MATRICES IN PRESENCE OF ADVERSARIES
Assume that two matrices A,B ∈ Fz×z are partitioned as A = [A0|A1| . . . |Am−1] and B =
[B0|B1| . . . |Bm−1] where Ai,Bi ∈ Fz× zm , for some integer m,m|z. We want to multiply A and BT
distributively over the workers. In the end, each worker needs to have (m, t, 0, d)-share of C = ABT .
Recall that we have N workers, and up to t of them are malicious. We will show that at the presence
of these malicious behavior, we still can derive the correct result. In this section we follow the same
protocol as it was demonstrated in Section V with some modifications, using the subroutines explained
in Section VI to detect and correct malicious behaviour of the workers.
1- Sharing phase: This phase is similar to the sharing phase of Section V.
2- Subsharing phase: Similar to Section V, each honest worker n wants to send the value of
polynomials An(x) and B
(j)
n (x), j = 0, . . . ,m − 1, at point αn′ to worker n′. But if worker n
is malicious, it can send inconsistence shares to the other workers to mislead the entire system and
possibly makes the final result incorrect. To prevent this we can use algorithm of subshare of shares. If
N ≥ 3t+m each honest worker n can subshare [A]n, [B]n,0, . . . [B]n,m−1 in the form of ([A]n, 1, t,m−
1) − EVSS, ([B]n,0, 1, t,m − 1) − EVSS, ([B]n,1, 1, t,m − 2) − EVSS, . . . , ([B]n,m−1, 1, t, 0) − EVSS,
respectively. Subshare of shares algorithm makes nodes to be sure that they have the correct values of
(1, t,m− 1, d)−share of [A]n and (1, t,m− 1− i, d)−share of [B]n,i, i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1}.
Let us denote the bivariate polynomial which is used in the above EVSS invocations by S(0)n (x, y),
S
(1)
n (x, y), . . . ,S
(m)
n (x, y), respectively. By following EVSS algorithm explained in Subsection VI, we
have
An(y) = S
(n)
0 (0, y), (18)
B(j)n (y) = S
(n)
j+1(0, y), j ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1}. (19)
By using Subroutine VI-C, workers can be sure that worker n uses m + 1 polynomials An(x) and
B
(j)
n (x) for j ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1} with degree m + t − 1 and m + t − j − 1, respectively, where the
coefficients of x` in An(x) is zero for ` ∈ [m− 1], and the coefficient of x`′ in B(j)n (x) is equal to zero
for `′ ∈ [m− j − 1]. Let us define Bn(x) as
Bn(x) ,
m−1∑
k=0
B(k)n (x)x
k = B(0)n (x) +B
(1)
n (x)x
1 + · · ·+B(m−1)n (x)xm−1. (20)
Each workers n′ can easily calculate Bn(αn′), for all n′ ∈ [N ]. Note that, we partition Bn(x)
into B(0)n (x), B
(1)
n (x), . . . , B
(m−1)
n (x), because we cannot verify the coefficients of x0, x1, . . . , xm−1,
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simultaneously, in Bn(x). One can see that, the coefficients of x0, x1, . . . , xm−1 in Bn(x), are equal to
the coefficient of x0 in polynomials B(0)n (x),B
(1)
n (x), . . . , B
(m−1)
n (x), respectively, which can be verified
by using Subroutine VI-C.
3- Constructing the product of subshares: Similar to the previous phase, existence of malicious
workers are the main concern in this phase. Up to now, there is a subset of workers, that each of them
has a verified version of subshares of shares of the others. The rest of the workers have been eliminated
from the process, because they have been identified as adversaries. Recall that each worker n needs to
have a share of C = ABT (i.e., F(d)ABT ,m,t,0(αn), for all n ∈ [N ]). As it was shown in Section V, there
exist m+ t− 1 polynomials O(n)0 (x),O(n)1 (x), . . . ,O(n)m+t−2(x) of degree t such that
Cn(x) , F(d)[A]n[B]Tn ,m,t,0(x) = An(x)Bn(x)−
m+t−2∑
`=0
xm+`O
(n)
` (x). (21)
After constructing polynomials O(n)0 (x),O
(n)
1 (x), . . . ,O
(n)
m+t−2(x), worker n shares them using EVSS.
Then, it shares Cn(x) directly to allow each node to verify the sharing process of Cn(x).
From (9), one can see that the coefficient of xj in Cn(x) is {[A]n[B]Tn}j for all non-negative j < m.
This is due to the fact that each O(n)` (x) is multiplied by x
m+` where ` ≥ m, thus these do not affect
the coefficient of xj , where j < m. Construction of each O(n)` (x) explained in Section VII in details.
Each honest workers n′ directly verifies that, if (21) does not hold, then it sends complaint message
and other workers verify this by invoking evaluating a shared polynomial algorithm, with the constraint
N > 3t+m. In other words, if node n′ sends a Complaint message, all nodes in collaboration with each
other can compute An(αn′),Bn(αn′),O0(αn′), . . . ,Om+t−2(αn′) and Cn(αn′). Then they can examine
if (21) holds at point αn′ or not. On top of that they can identify the malicious nodes. If there is no
complaint, each node n′ accepts Cn(αn′) as the correct share of [A]n[B]Tn . Assume that the dealer
(here node n) is malicious and wants to cheat. The algorithm of subshare of shares, prevents cheating
in sharing of An(x) and Bn(x). Also using EVSS makes us sure that the degree of polynomials Cn(x)
and O(n)i (x) are m + t − 1 and t, respectively, for all i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m + t − 2}. So if there exists any
adversarial behaviour, the degree of C˜n(x) , An(x)Bn(x)−
m+t−2∑
`=0
xm+`O
(n)
` (x) is at most 2m+2t−2.
Assume that C˜n(x) 6= Cn(x). Since deg(Cn(x)) = m+ t− 1 and deg(C˜n(x)) is at most 2m+ 2t− 2,
C˜n(x) can have at most 2t + 2m − 2 common points with Cn(x). So if at least 2m + 2t − 1 honest
nodes verify that C˜n(x) is consistent with Cn(x), it means that C˜n(x) = Cn(x). Thus, if we have
N ≥ 3t+ 2m− 1, honest nodes can derive their shares, correctly.
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4- Constructing shares of product: This phase is similar to the constructing shares of product matrix
of Section V.
VIII. TRANSFORMING SHARES
In this section, we explain how to change the parameters of the shares. This is needed to be able to
handle arbitrary polynomials, as we will see later.
A. Direct to Reverse Polynomial Sharing
Assume that matrix A = [A0,A1, . . . ,Am−1] ∈ Fk×k is shared among N nodes directly, i.e., each
node n has received F(d)A,m,t,0(αn) = A0 +A1αn+A2α
2
n+ · · ·+Am−1αm−1n +R1αmn + · · ·+Rtαm+t−1n ,
where Ri are chosen uniformly and independently from Fk×
k
m . All nodes aim to obtain shares of matrix
A in reverse polynomial sharing format, i.e., each node n needs to have F(r)A,m,t,0(αn). To this end, each
node n is enough to have the value of m polynomials A(0)(x),A(1)(x), . . . ,A(m−1)(x) at point αn
where,
A(0)(x) , A0 +R(0)1 x+R
(0)
2 x
2 + · · ·+R(0)t xt = F(d)A0,1,t,0 (22)
A(1)(x) , A1 +R(1)1 x2 +R
(1)
2 x
3 + · · ·+R(1)t xt+1 = F(d)A1,1,t,1 (23)
A(2)(x) , A2 +R(2)1 x3 +R
(2)
2 x
4 + · · ·+R(2)t xt+2 = F(d)A2,1,t,2 (24)
... (25)
A(m−1)(x) , Am−1 +R(m−1)1 xm +R
(m−1)
2 x
m+1 + · · ·+R(m−1)t xm+t−1 = F(d)Am−1,1,t,m−1, (26)
where R(i)j are chosen uniformly and independently at random from F
k× k
m , for all i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m −
1} and j ∈ [t]. Then, node n computes the value of A(m−1)(x) + xA(m−2)(x) + x2A(m−3)(x) + · · ·+
xm−1A(0)(x) at point αn, which is equal to F
(r)
A,m,t,0(αn), as shown here:
A(m−1)(x)+xA(m−2)(x) + x2A(m−3)(x) + · · ·+ xm−1A(0)(x)
=Am−1 +Am−2x+Am−3x2 + · · ·+A0xm−1 + (
m−1∑
i=0
R
(i)
1 )x
m + · · ·+ (
m−1∑
i=0
R
(i)
t )x
m+t−1
=Am−1 +Am−2x+Am−3x2 + · · ·+A0xm−1 + Z1xm + Z2xm+1 + · · ·+ Ztxm+t−1
=F
(r)
A,m,t,0(x),
(27)
April 13, 2020 DRAFT
30
where Zj ,
m−1∑
i=0
R
(i)
j .
To do this, we follow a 2-phase scheme.
1- Subsharing Phase: Each node n has F(d)A,m,t,0(αn) as its own share, and sub-shares it, in the
form of (F(d)A,m,t,0(αn), 1, t, k − 1) − EVSS, according to Algorithm VI-C. Then each node n′ has
access to the value of F(d)
F
(d)
A,m,t,0(αn),1,t,k−1
(x) = F
(d)
A,m,t,0(αn) + R1x
k + R2x
k+1 + · · · + Rtxk+t−1
at point αn′ , for all n, n′ ∈ [N ]. We will see that if node n′ combines F(d)
F
(d)
A,m,t,0(α1),1,t,k−1
(αn′),
F
(d)
F
(d)
A,m,t,0(α2),1,t,k−1
(αn′), . . . ,F
(d)
F
(d)
A,m,t,0(αN ),1,t,k−1
(αn′) with right coefficients, it can calculate A(k)(αn′).
Each node n does the similar scheme, for all k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}.
2- Constructing Shares Phase: For each k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1} and each node n′, it has access to
F
(d)
F
(d)
A,m,t,0(αn),1,t,k−1
(αn′) = F
(d)
A,m,t,0(αn)+R1α
k
n′+R2α
k+1
n′ +· · ·+Rtαk+t−1n′ . Since Ai is the coefficient
of xi in F(d)A,m,t,0(x), if N ≥ m+ t, there exist λ1, λ2, . . . , λN such that
N∑
i=1
λiF
(d)
A,m,t,0(αi) = Ai. Each
node n′ computes
N∑
i=1
λiF
(d)
F
(d)
A,m,t,0(αi),1,t,k−1
(αn′) to derive A(k)(x) = F
(d)
Ai,1,t,k−1(αn′). This scheme
enables node n to derive A(0)(αn), A(1)(αn), . . . ,A(m−1)(αn). Finally, as mentioned in (27), it can
compute F(r)A,m,t,0(αn).
Remark 12: To obtain direct polynomial shares from reverse polynomial sharing format, we can
follow similar steps.
B. Shares of Transposed Matrix
Assume that matrix A = [A0,A1, . . . ,Am−1] ∈ Fk×k is shared among N nodes. It means that each
node n has the value of polynomial F(d)A,m,t,0(x) , A0 + A1x + A2x2 · · · + Am−1xm−1 + R1xm +
R2x
m+1 + · · · + Rtxm+t−1 at x = αn where Ri are chosen uniformly and independently at random
from Fk×
k
m . The goal is that each node has a share of matrix AT . Let us partition A as follows.
A =

A0,0 A0,1 . . . A0,m−1
A1,0 A1,1 . . . A1,m−1
...
...
. . .
...
Am−1,0 Am−1,1 . . . Am−1,m−1
 , (28)
(29)
where Ai,j ∈ F km× km for i, j ∈ {0, 1, ...,m − 1}. To share matrix AT , each node n needs A(T)(αn)
where,
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A(T)(x) =

A0,0
A0,1
...
A0,m−1
+

A1,0
A1,1
...
A1,m−1
x+ . . .

Am−1,0
Am−1,1
...
Am−1,m−1
x
m−1 +R′1x
m +R′2x
m+1 + · · ·+R′txm+t−1.
(30)
To reach to our goal, each node n needs to have the value of m polynomials A(0)(x),A(1)(x), . . .
,A(m−1)(x) at point αn, where
A(m−1,0)(x) , Am−1,0 +R(m−1,0)1 x+R
(m−1,0)
2 x
2 + · · ·+R(m−1,0)t xt = F(d)Am−1,0,1,t,0 (31)
A(m−2,0)(x) , Am−2,0 +R(m−2,0)1 x2 +R
(m−2,0)
2 x
3 + · · ·+R(m−2,0)t xt+1 = F(d)Am−2,0,1,t,1 (32)
A(m−3,0)(x) , Am−3,0 +R(m−3,0)1 x3 +R
(m−3,0)
2 x
4 + · · ·+R(m−3,0)t xt+2 = F(d)Am−3,0,1,t,2 (33)
... (34)
A(0,0)(x) , A0,0 +R(0,0)1 xm +R
(0,0)
2 x
m+1 + · · ·+R(0,0)t xm+t−1 = F(d)A0,0,1,t,m−1, (35)
where R(i,l)j ∈ F
k
m
× k
m are chosen uniformly and independently at random, for all i, l ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m −
1} and j ∈ [t]. Then, each node n computes the value of A(0)(x) = A(0,0)(x)+xA(1,0)(x)+x2A(2,0)(x)+
· · ·+ xm−1A(m−1,0)(x) at point αn to derive F(r)[A0,0,A1,0,...,Am−1,0],m,t,0(αn), as shown here:
A(0)(x) =A(0,0)(x) + xA(1,0)(x) + x2A(2,0)(x) + · · ·+ xm−1A(m−1,0)(x)
=A0,0 +A1,0x+A2,0x
2 + · · ·+Am−1,0xm−1 + (
m−1∑
i=0
R
(i,0)
1 )x
m + · · ·+ (
m−1∑
i=0
R
(i,0)
t )x
m+t−1
=A0,0 +A1,0x+A2,0x
2 + · · ·+Am−1,0xm−1 + Z(0)1 xm + Z(0)2 xm+1 + · · ·+ Z(0)t xm+t−1
=F
(r)
[A0,0,A1,0,...,Am−1,0],m,t,0
(x),
(36)
where Z(0)j =
m−1∑
i=0
R
(i,0)
j .
Clearly, A(0)(αn) is direct polynomial share of first row of matrix AT . Node n follows the same steps
in collaboration with others, to obtain A(1)(αn),A(2)(αn), . . . , and A(m−1)(αn). Finally it can make its
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share equal to

A(0)(αn)
A(1)(αn)
...
A(m−1)(αn)
. To obtain A
(0)(αn) we can follow a 2-phase scheme.
1- Subsharing Phase: Each node n has F(d)A,m,t,0(αn) =

F
(d)
A,m,t,0(αn)0
F
(d)
A,m,t,0(αn)1
...
F
(d)
A,m,t,0(αn)m−1
 as its own share. To
construct A(i,0)(x), node n subshares F(d)A,m,t,0(αn)i in the form of (F
(d)
A,m,t,0(αn)i, 1, t,m−i−1)−EVSS,
according to Algorithm VI-C. Then each node n′ has access to the value of F(d)
F
(d)
A,m,t,0(αn)i,1,t,m−i−1
(x) =
F
(d)
A,m,t,0(αn)i +R1x
m−i +R2xm−i+1 + · · ·+Rtxm−i+t−1 at point αn′ , for all n, n′ ∈ [N ].
We will see that if node n′ combines F(d)
F
(d)
A,m,t,0(α1)i,1,t,m−i−1
(αn′), F
(d)
F
(d)
A,m,t,0(α2)i,1,t,m−i−1
(αn′), . . . ,
F
(d)
F
(d)
A,m,t,0(αN )i,1,t,m−i−1
(αn′) with right coefficients, it can derive A(i,0)(αn′). Each node n follows the
same steps to compute A(i,0)(αn).
2- Constructing Shares Phase: For each i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1}, each node n′ has access to
F
(d)
F
(d)
A,m,t,0(αn)i,1,t,m−i−1
(αn′) = F
(d)
A,m,t,0(αn)i +R1α
m−i
n′ +R2α
m−i+1
n′ + · · ·+Rtαm−i+t−1n′ . (37)
If N ≥ m+ t, there exist λ1, λ2, . . . , λN such that
N∑
j=1
λjF
(d)
A,m,t,0(αj)i = Ai,0. Each node n
′ computes
N∑
j=1
λjF
(d)
F
(d)
A,m,t,0(αj)i,1,t,m−i−1
(αn′) to derive A(i,0)(x) = F
(d)
Ai,0,1,t,m−i−1(αn′). This scheme enables node
n to achieve A(0,0)(αn),A(1,0)(αn), . . . ,A(m−1,0)(αn). Finally, as explained in (36), it can compute
A(0)(x).
IX. COMPUTING AN ARBITRARY POLYNOMIAL
Any polynomial of input matrices can be computed as a combination of operations like pair-wise
matrix multiplication, matrix addition, matrix transposing and changing the parameters of sharing.
In Section IV, we show how to share input matrices using polynomial sharing. In Section VII, we show
how to multiply two matrices where the polynomial shares of those matrices are available at the nodes,
and finally at the end, each node has a polynomial share of the final result. In addition, we prove that
the result of the multiplication is correct. In Section VIII, we show that if workers have the polynomial
shares of a matrix, how nodes can communicate with each other such that each node can derive correctly
the polynomial share of the transpose of that matrix without leaking any information. In Section VIII,
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we also show that if each node has a polynomial share of a matrix, how nodes can communicate with
each other to have the polynomial shares of the same matrix with different parameter correctly without
leaking information.
If we have a polynomial share of two matrices with the same parameters, if each node simply adds
its shares, it will have the polynomial share of the addition of those matrices. Therefore, we can apply
those algorithms, one after the other, to compute the polynomial share of the final result correctly. If
N ≥ 3t+ 2m− 1, we can manage such that each node n has F(d)result,m,t,0(αn) which is the polynomial
share of the final result. If each of the nodes sends its share to the data collector, it can recover the final
result even though t of the nodes are adversary. The above arguments establish the correctness of the
final result.
In Section VI, Section VII and Section VIII we have not proved that the proposed algorithms and
subroutines satisfy the privacy constraints. In the next section we prove the privacy constraints of the
proposed scheme.
X. PROOF OF PRIVACY FOR THE PROPOSED SCHEME
A. Overview of Privacy
Let us assume that the goal is to compute an arbitrary function of inputs X = {X[1],X[2], . . . ,X[Γ]}.
This computation is done in ∆ ∈ N rounds, where in each round one operation of sharing, multiplica-
tion, addition, changing the parameter of sharing, or transposing is performed, using the algorithms or
subroutines explained in the paper. Let us define Y(δ)S as the set of all messages that malicious workers
receive during round δ. To prove that the algorithm has no data leakage to the workers, we need to prove
that
I(Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(∆)S ;X ) = H(Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(∆)S )−H(Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(∆)S |X ) = 0
In other words, we need to prove that,
H(Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(∆)S ) =H(Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(∆)S |X ) (38)
=
∆∑
δ=1
H(Y(δ)S |X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ). (39)
If we can prove that H(Y(δ)S |X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ) = H(Y(δ)S ) for δ = 1, 2, . . . ,∆, then (38) is
correct. In what follows, we prove (38) for the cases if in round δ the system does sharing using EVSS
(Subsection VI-A), multiplication of two matrices (Section VII), transposing a matrix (Subsection VIII-B)
and changing the parameter of sharing (Subsection VIII-A).
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B. Proof of Privacy for Sharing:
Assume that at round δ, one of the sources, e.g., source γ shares matrix X[γ] = [X[γ]0 ,X
[γ]
1 , . . . ,X
[γ]
m−1]
to be able to perform some computation on it in the next rounds. At the beginning of this round each
worker n has F(d)
X [γ],m,t,0
(x) = X
[γ]
0 + X
[γ]
1 x + · · · + X[γ]m−1xm−1 + R(δ,γ,0)xm + R(δ,γ,1)xm+1 + · · · +
R(δ,γ,t−1)xm+t−1 for x = αn. Let us define R(δ,0) as follows
R(δ,0) = {R(δ,γ,τ)|γ ∈ [Γ] and τ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t− 1}}. (40)
In fact, R(δ,0) is the set of all random matrices that source uses in this phase.
Remark 13: We know that the number of malicious nodes |S| is at most t. First, in case of |S| = t,
we prove the privacy. In the second case, we assume that |S| ≤ t. Obviously, the set of all messages that
malicious nodes can achieve in the second case, is a subset of the set of the data in the first case. Thus,
if we prove the privacy in the first case, then it prove the privacy of the second case, automatically.
Let Y(δ)S be the set of all messages that malicious nodes S = {s1, s2, . . . , st} receive from source
γ in this step. One can see that the size of sets Y(δ)S and R(δ,0) are equal with each other which is
t× Γ. It means that the number of independent messages is equal with the number of random matrices
that source γ have been used. Thus, there is one to one corresponding between pairs (X ,R(δ,0)) and
(X ,Y(δ)S ). Therefore, H(YδS |X ) = H(R(δ,0)|X ). Finally we can conclude that,
H(Y(δ)S )|X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ) = H(R(δ,0)|X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ) (41)
= H(R(δ,0)|X ) = H(R(δ,0))
(a)
≥ H(Y(δ)S )), (42)
where (a) follows from the fact that Y(δ)S and R(δ,0) have the same size, while R(δ,0) is selected uniformly
and independently at random from the set of all matrices with the same size.
C. Proof of Privacy for Multiplication
Here we prove that if in round δ the operation is multiplication of two matrices, then
H(Y(δ)S )|X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ) = H(Y(δ)S ). (43)
We go through phases of the algorithm for multiplication of two matrices A, and B.
1) Subsharig phase: Step 1 (EVSS): Node n has access to [A]n = F
(d)
A,m,t,0(αn) and [B]n =
[B]n,0
[B]n,1
...
[B]n,m−1
 = F
(r)
B,m,t,0(αn). This node subshares [A]n and [B]n,j , for all j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . ,m−1}. To
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share [A]n, node n uses a bivariate polynomial Sn(x, y) =
m+t−1∑
j=0
m+t−1∑
i=0
Si,jx
iyj such that S0,j = [A]j
for all 0 ≤ j < m− 1 and Si,j , are selected independently and uniformly at random from Fk× km , for all
i 6= 0 or m ≤ j. We partition these random coefficients into two sets. First, let R(δ,A) = {Si,j |(i
m+t⊕ j ∈
{t, t + 1, . . . ,m + t − 1}) or (i ≥ m)}, where m+t⊕ denotes addition mod m + t, and the remaining
coefficients are in set R′(δ,A). Note that |R(δ,A)| = mt+ (m+ t)t = t2 + 2mt and |R′(δ,A)| = m2 −m.
As it was mentioned in VI-A, the number of independent equations that malicious workers receive during
each EVSS invocation is equal to t(m+ t) + tm = t2 + 2m. One can see that the number of independent
equations is less than the number of random matrices. We show the set of all independent equations
(independent messages) which malicious nodes receive during the sharing of A by Y(δ,A)S . Assume
that the set R′(δ,A) is known for malicious adversaries. One can see that (1) Y(δ,A)S is a function of
Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ,R′(δ,A), and R(δ,A). (2) Given Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ,R′(δ,A), there is a one to one
mapping between Y(δ,A)S and R(δ,A). Thus,
H(Y(δ,A)S |X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ) ≥H(Y(δ,A)S |X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ,R′(δ,A)) (44)
=H(R(δ,A)|X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ,R′(δ,A)) (45)
=H(R(δ,A))
(a)
≥ H(Y(δ,A)S ), (46)
where (a) is valid because Y(δ,A)S have the same size with R(δ,A), and R(δ,A) is selected uniformly and
independently at random from the set of all matrices with the same size. We follow the same steps for
[B]n and construct Y(δ,B)S ,R(δ,B) and R′(δ,B). Thus we have
H(Y(δ,B)S |X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ,Y(δ,A)S ) ≥H(Y(δ,B)S |X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ,Y(δ,A)S ,R′(δ,B)) (47)
=H(R(δ,B)|X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ,Y(δ,A)S ,R′(δ,B)) (48)
=H(R(δ,B))
(a)
≥ H(Y(δ,B)S ). (49)
Step 2: To be able to verify subshare of shares (Algorithm 3), each worker broadcasts the product
of it’s subshares vector and parity-check matrix H. In other words, as mentioned in Subsection 2, each
honest node n sends the value of Y(x) = [Y1(x),Y2(x), . . . ,Ym(x)] , [Q1(x), Q2(x), . . . , QN (x)]H
at point αn to all other nodes. One can see that each Yi(x) has exactly t + 1 non-zero coefficients.
Each malicious node n′ has the value of Yi(x) at point αn′ . Hence, malicious adversaries has the value
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of Yi(x) at t points. In addition we know that the value of Yi(0) is equal to 0. By using Lagrange
interpolation rules, malicious can construct Yi(x) their self. Hence they can compute the value of Y(x) =
[Y1(x),Y2(x), . . . ,Ym(x)] at any point. Thus, they can not gain any additional information beyond what
they have had before.
As shown, in this step, malicious workers can not gain any independent equation with equations,
received in Step 1. Thus if we call the set of messages, which the malicious workers receive from other
parties as Y(δ,2)S , we have
H(Y(δ,2)S |X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ,Y(δ,A)S ,Y(δ,B)S ) = 0. (50)
2) Constructing the product of subshares:: Step 1: First, each honest worker n constructs O(n)l (x) =
Rl,0 +Rl,1x+ · · ·+Rl,t−1xt−1 +D(n)l xt of degree t, where 0 ≤ l ≤ m+ t− 2. Let us call the set of all
random matrices which are used in this step as R(δ,O) = {Rl,j |0 ≤ l ≤ m + t − 2 and 0 ≤ j ≤ t − 1}
and let us define Y(δ,O)S as the set of all messages which malicious workers receive from the other nodes.
Malicious nodes have the value of O(n)l at t points for each honest node n and 0 ≤ l ≤ m + t − 2.
On the other hand, the number of random matrices used in O(n)l is t. Thus, the number of independent
messages |Y(δ,O)S | is equal with the number of random unknown matrices |R(δ,O)|. Due to the fact that
Y(δ,O)S is a linear function of R(δ,O), Hence, there is one to one mapping between elements of R(δ,O)
and Y(δ,O)S . It means that,
H(Y(δ,O)S |X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ,Y(δ,A)S ,Y(δ,B)S ,Y(δ,2)S ) (51)
= H(R(δ,O)|X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ,Y(δ,A)S ,Y(δ,B)S ,Y(δ,2)S )
(52)
= H(R(δ,O)) a≥ H(Y(δ,O)S ), (53)
where (a) is valid because Y(δ,O)S and R(δ,O) have the same size, while R(δ,O) is selected uniformly and
independently at random from the set of all matrices with the same size.
Step 2: In this step, each honest node n, invokes Algorithm 1 to share Cn(x). We define Y(δ,C)S as
the set of all messages which malicious nodes receive from the other nodes in this step. Similar to Step
2 of Subsection X-C1, by partitioning random matrices into R(δ,C) and R′(δ,C), we can prove that,
H(Y(δ,C)S |X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ,Y(δ,A)S ,Y(δ,B)S ,Y(δ,2)S ,Y(δ,O)S ) ≥ H(Y(δ,C)S ). (54)
Step 3: This step is needed for verification of complaints in constructing the product of subshares phase.
Assume that node n′ sends a complaint message. Then all nodes compute values of An(αn′),Bn(αn′),
April 13, 2020 DRAFT
37
O
(n)
0 (αn′), . . . , O
(n)
m+t−2(αn′) and Cn(αn′), together by invoking Algorithm 5. Sending complaint mes-
sage from node n′ means that at least one node n′ or the dealer (node n) is malicious. So these values
are known to the malicious nodes. Hence, these values cannot add any additional information to the
malicious nodes. Thus, if we call Y(δ,E)S as the set of all messages which malicious parties receive in
this step, we have
H(Y(δ,E)S |X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ,Y(δ,A)S ,Y(δ,B)S ,Y(δ,2)S ,Y(δ,O)S ,Y(δ,C)S ) = 0. (55)
It should be mentioned that, in the process of complaints verification in this step, each node i subshares
its share, i.e., An(αi),Bn(αi),O
(n)
0 (αi), . . . ,O
(n)
m+t−2(αi) and Cn(αi). We define Y(δ,E
′)
S as the set of
all messages which malicious nodes receive from other parties in this step. Similar to Step 2 of X-C1,
by partitioning random matrices into R(δ,E′) and R′(δ,E′), we can prove that,
H(Y(δ,E′)S |X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ,Y(δ,A)S ,Y(δ,B)S ,Y(δ,2)S ,Y(δ,O)S ,Y(δ,C)S ,Y(δ,E)S ) ≥ H(Y(δ,E
′)
S ). (56)
D. Proof of Privacy for Transposing:
As it was mentioned in Subsection VIII-B, to be able to derive the shares of matrix AT from shares
of matrix A, we need to follows a 2-step method as explained in VIII-B. In the first step, each node
n needs to compute A(0)(x),A(2)(x), . . . ,A(m−1)(x) at point αn for each n. To do this, all nodes use
subshare of shares algorithm (Algorithm 3). The privacy proof of subshare of shares algorithm is similar
to privacy of subshare of shares which is shown in Subsection X-C1. In the second step, there is no
communication among nodes. Thus there is no data leakage at this step.
E. Proof of Privacy for Changing the Parameter of the Shares:
Similar to the previous subsection, all nodes need to follow a 2-step algorithm. First, nodes need to
use subshare of shares algorithm (Algorithm 3). The privacy of subshare of shares algorithm is proved
in Subsection X-C1. And in the second step, there is no communication among nodes. Thus there is no
data leakage at this step.
F. Proof of Privacy for One Round in the Algorithm:
To be able to prove that the mutual information of input matrices and the set of all messages that
malicious nodes receive in different rounds is 0, we need to prove that for each round δ,
H(Y(δ)S |X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ) = H(Y(δ)S ). (57)
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Here we prove (57) for the cases, where round δ is multiplication of two matrices. For other operations,
we can follow the same steps.
H(Y(δ)S |X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ) = H(Y(δ,A)S ,Y(δ,B)S ,Y(δ,O)S ,Y(δ,C)S ,Y(δ,E
′)
S |X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S )
(58)
= H(Y(δ,A)S |X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ) (59)
+H(Y(δ,B)S |X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ,Y(δ,A)S ) (60)
+H(Y(δ,O)S |X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ,Y(δ,A)S ,Y(δ,B)S ) (61)
+H(Y(δ,C)S |X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ,Y(δ,A)S ,Y(δ,B)S ,Y(δ,O)S ) (62)
+H(Y(δ,E′)S |X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ,Y(δ,A)S ,Y(δ,B)S ,Y(δ,O)S ,Y(δ,C)S )
(63)
≥ H(Y(δ,A)S ) +H(Y(δ,B)S ) +H(Y(δ,O)S ) +H(Y(δ,C)S ) +H(Y(δ,E
′)
S )
(64)
≥ H(Y(δ,A)S ,Y(δ,B)S ,Y(δ,O)S ,Y(δ,C)S ,Y(δ,E
′)
S ) (65)
Thus, we have
H(Y(δ)S |X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S ) = H(Y(δ)S ).
G. Proof of Privacy for the Algorithm:
Let us define Y(δ)S as the set of all messages that malicious workers achieve in round δ. Assume that
the algorithm is executed in ∆ rounds. To prove that the algorithm has no data leakage, it is sufficient
to prove that I(Y1S ,Y2S , ...,Y∆S ;X ) = 0. One can see that
H(Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(∆)S |X ) =
∆∑
δ=1
H(Y(δ)S |X ,Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(δ−1)S )
≥
∆∑
δ=1
H(Y(δ)S ) ≥ H(Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(∆)S ).
Hence, obviously
I(Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(∆)S ;X ) = H(Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(∆)S )−H(Y(1)S ,Y(2)S , ...,Y(∆)S |X ) = 0.
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